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PACE LAW REVIEW
Volume 28 Summer 2008 Number 4
Symposium:
Victims and the Criminal
Justice System
Foreword
Luis E. Chiesa*
On April 4, 2008, Pace Law School hosted a groundbreak-
ing symposium that brought together various prominent crimi-
nal law scholars to address pressing questions about the
importance of the victim in the administration of criminal jus-
tice. The distinguishing feature of the symposium was its inter-
national flavor. This was the first time that American and
Spanish scholars engaged in an academic debate about impor-
tant issues of criminal theory. As such, it constituted an impor-
tant step in bridging the gap between common and civil law
approaches to penal responsibility issues. At first glance, one
might be tempted to conclude that Anglo-American criminal
law scholars have little to learn from their continental counter-
parts and vice-versa. The contributions to this symposium is-
sue reveal, however, that there is much to gain and little to lose
from reaching out to scholars on the other side of the Atlantic.
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School.
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Mter all, if the problems of criminal law are universal in na-
ture, it seems obvious that we will profit from engaging in a
transnational debate about the fundamental problems of crimi-
nal theory. And profit we did.
The contributors to the symposium presented papers on a
wide array of issues. Some, like Leo Zaibert and Ifigo Ortiz de
Urbina, broke new ground by focusing on old (and not so old)
debates. Zaibert took the George Fletcher/Michael Moore ex-
change on the role of victims in the theory of retribution' to the
next level by cogently arguing that an appeal to victims is pre-
sent in many conceptions of retributivism, including-notwith-
standing his contention to the contrary-Moore's own version of
the theory.2 This approach constitutes a direct affront to the
conventional wisdom, for retributivists usually argue that the
victim's desires should have little, if any, bearing on determina-
tions of punishment. Ortiz de Urbina, on the other hand, seized
on a debate sparked by Vera Bergelson's impressive article on
comparative liability in the criminal law3 to shed light on vari-
ous important issues. With great acuity (and a healthy dose of
humor), Ortiz de Urbina undertook several notoriously difficult
tasks, such as ascertaining the rationales underlying the con-
sent, self-defense, and provocation defenses and explaining the
different ways in which the rights specification, conditionality
of rights, and forfeiture theories may inform our conception of
justification defenses. 4
A couple of interesting articles focused on answering the
questions about "how, what, and how much to punish." Jesfis
Maria Silva Sdnchez tackled the "how to punish question" by
suggesting that, as a general rule, victim-centered theories of
punishment should lead to rejecting offender imprisonment, for
victim vindication can be successfully achieved by resorting to
"symbolic" and "expressive" declarations of condemnation (e.g.,
1. See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 51 (1999); Michael S. Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply
to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65 (1999).
2. Leo Zaibert, The Ideal Victim, 28 Pace L. Rev. 885, 899 (2008).
3. Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative
Liability in the Criminal Law, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 385 (2005).
4. See generally Ortiz de Urbina, Old Wine in New Wineskins? Appraising
Professor Bergelson's Plea for Comparative Criminal Liability, 28 PACE L. REV. 815
(2008).
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by procuring a guilty verdict).5 Regarding the '"how much to
punish" question, Guyora Binder argued that victims' suffering
provides the State with good reason to punish actual harm more
severely than risky conduct that does not cause harm. This ar-
gument offers a solution to the moral luck puzzle: the punish-
ment of harm matters because doing so "contributes to the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system by vindicating victims"
that have been humiliated by the perpetrator's injurious
conduct. 6
Vera Bergelson, Manuel Cancio MeliA, and Russell Christo-
pher discussed how the victim's acquiescence to engage in cer-
tain conduct with the alleged offender may operate to relieve
the defendant of criminal responsibility. Bergelson offered a
well-reasoned plea in favor of a general defense of consent.
However, she suggested that the defense should only attach if
the following three requirements are met: (1) the victim freely
consented to the perpetrator's conduct, (2) the state of affairs
that results amounts to an objectively preferable outcome, and
(3) the offender is subjectively aware of the victim's consent and
believes that it is necessary to harm the victim in order to
achieve the preferable outcome.7
While Bergelson focused on the exculpatory effect of con-
sent, Manuel Cancio MeliA inquired about whether the victim's
voluntary decision to engage in a risky joint enterprise with the
offender should preclude imposing liability on the offender. For
Cancio Melid, a person with freedom to act must assume re-
sponsibility for the harms directly caused by his autonomous
conduct, regardless of whether the person harmed is a third
party or the victim herself. Therefore, those who engage in a
dangerous joint enterprise must assume responsibility for their
own harms in much the same way as they must accept responsi-
bility for the injuries that their dangerous conduct may cause to
5. Silva Sanchez, Doctrines Regarding "The Fight Against Impunity" and "The
Victim's Right for the Perpetrator to be Punished", 28 PACE L. REV. 865, 877-79
(2008).
6. Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE L.
REV. 713, 736 (2008).
7. Vera Bergelson, Consent to Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 683, 699 (2008).
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others.8 In such cases it is difficult to single out one of the par-
ties that is jointly engaging in the conduct as either victim or
offender.
Russell Christopher's article also discusses the subtle ways
in which victimhood and offenderhood intertwine by examining,
among other cases, instances of statutory rape in which a minor
convinces an adult to engage in sexual intercourse by falsely
representing that he or she is over the legal age of consent.
Christopher argues that while the perpetrator who has sex with
the underage child is the offender of the crime, the child has
also committed rape, in his case, by fraud. Thus, both the child
and the adult should simultaneously be considered both victims
and offenders of the crime of rape. When the victim and of-
fender labels get confused in such a manner, Christopher ar-
gues that both parties should have a defense for the crime that
they have otherwise committed. The child should be relieved of
responsibility for rape by fraud and the adult should not be held
liable for statutory rape.9
Several of us attempted to expand the concept of "vic-
timhood" to encompass offenses that would traditionally be con-
sidered "victimless crimes." Carlos G6mez Jara Diez, for
example, argued in favor of affording victimhood status to cor-
porations that are mismanaged, even when both the sharehold-
ers and the management .consent to the mismanagement. 10
This amounts to a reconceptualization of the status of corpora-
tions, for the traditional view holds that their interests are in-
extricably tied to the interests of management and
shareholders. Audrey Rogers undertook a reconceptualization
of her own when she proposed that we reject the traditional in-
terpretation of possession of child pornography statutes as of-
fenses that merely seek to deter future harmful conduct. In her
opinion, it is better to think of these crimes as offenses that seek
to redress conduct that causes actual harm to the child depicted
8. See generally Cancio MeliA, Victims and Self-Liability in Criminal Law: Be-
yond Contributive Negligence and Foreseeability (Without Blaming the Victim), 28
PACE L. REV. 739 (2008).
9. See generally Russell Christopher, Should Being a Victim of a Crime Be a
Defense to the Same or a Different Crime?, 28 PACE L. REV. 783 (2008).
10. See generally Gomez Jara-Diez, Corporations as Victims of Mismanage-
ment: Beyond the Shareholders vs. Managers Debate, 28 PACE L. REv. 795 (2008).
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in the photo." I also attempted to challenge the conventional
understanding of victimhood when I proposed that animals be
treated as "victims" for many purposes, including the possibility
that restitution be paid to the creatures. The point of departure
for my argument was the surprising decision of a United States
District Court to order that the now infamous football superstar
Michael Vick make restitution for the full amount associated
with the care of the dogs that he kept for his illegal dog fighting
operation. 12
Finally, David Aaronson provided us with a thorough ex-
amination of the ebbs and flows of the victims' rights movement
from the early 1980s to the enactment of Crime Victims' Rights
Act of 2004.13 Aaronson's piece helps us understand the ways in
which the criminal process has changed in order to accommo-
date the interests of victims and the challenges that such
changes raise.
I am delighted to see these papers published in the Pace
Law Review. The contributions to this special issue demon-
strate the benefits that can be reaped from engaging in a trans-
national dialogue about fundamental issues in criminal theory.
One can only hope that this will be the first of many conversa-
tions between American and Spanish criminal theorists. It was
an honor to have played a small role in this venture alongside
the members of the Pace Law Review, especially Jennifer
Ramme, Ayokeji Ayorinde and Deborah Sommers. Without
their invaluable assistance this project would not have come
into fruition.
11. See generally Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography's Forgotten Victims, 28
PACE L. REV. 847 (2008).
12. See generally Luis Chiesa, Of Persons and the Criminal Law: (Second
Tier) Personhood as a Prerequisite for Victimhood, 28 PACE L. REV. 759 (2008).
13. See generally David Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies: The Federal
Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623 (2008).
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